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 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1170 
_____________ 
 
DAWN GUIDOTTI, on behalf of herself and all  
other class members similarly situated, 
 
v. 
 
LEGAL HELPERS DEBT RESOLUTION, L.L.C., a/k/a The 
Law Firm of Macey, Aleman, Hyslip and Searns; ECLIPSE 
SERVICING, INC., f/k/a Eclipse Financial, Inc.; GLOBAL 
CLIENT SOLUTIONS, L.L.C.; LEGAL SERVICES 
SUPPORT GROUP, L.L.C.; JG DEBT SOLUTIONS, L.L.C.; 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN BANK AND TRUST OF 
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO; LYNCH 
FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, INC., trading as: Financial 
Solutions Legal Center, Financial Solutions Consumer 
Center, Financial Solutions Processing Center; JEM GROUP, 
INC.; CENTURY MITIGATIONS, L.P.; LEGAL HELPERS, 
P.C., trading as: The Law Firm of Macey and Aleman; 
THOMAS G. MACEY; JEFFREY J. ALEMAN; JASON E. 
SEARNS; JEFFREY HYSLIP; THOMAS M. NICELY; 
JOEL GAVALAS; AMBER N. DUNCAN; HARRY 
HEDAYA; DOUGLAS L. MCCLURE; MICHAEL 
HENDRIX; JOHN DOE(S) 1-100; JIM DOE(S) 1-1000; 
TOM DOE(S) 1-1000, the said names of John Doe(s), Jim 
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Doe(s) and Tim Doe(s) being fictitious; STEPHEN CHAYA; 
RELIANT ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT, L.L.C. 
 
GLOBAL CLIENT SOLUTIONS, L.L.C.; 
        ROCKY MOUNTAIN BANK AND TRUST  
       OF COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO, 
Appellants 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. No. 11-cv-1219) 
District Judge:  Hon. Jerome B. Simandle 
_______________ 
 
Argued 
March 5, 2013 
 
Before:   SCIRICA, JORDAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 28, 2013) 
_______________ 
 
Shaji M. Eapen 
Morgan Melhuish Abrutyn 
651 W. Mount Pleasant Avenue - #200 
Livingston, NJ   07039 
 
Richard W. Epstein 
Greenspoon Marder 
200 E. Broward Blvd. - #1500 
Ft. Lauderdale, FL  33301 
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John H. Pelzer   [ARGUED] 
Greenspoon Marder 
100 W. Cypress Creek Rd. - #700 
Ft. Lauderdale, Fl   33309 
          Counsel for Appellants 
 
Joseph M. Pinto   [ARGUED] 
Polino and Pinto 
720 E. Main Street – Ste. 1C 
Morrestown, NJ   08057 
          Counsel for Appellee 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Dawn Guidotti contracted with several parties to help 
her negotiate a settlement of her consumer debt.  When no 
settlement materialized, she filed this putative class action 
against them, claiming that she, and people like her, had been 
defrauded.  The United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey granted a motion to compel arbitration as to the 
claims against most of the defendants, but it denied the 
motion as it pertained to Rocky Mountain Bank and Trust 
(“RMBT”) and Global Client Solutions (“Global”) 
(collectively, the “Appellants”).  With respect to those two 
defendants, the Court held that the pleadings and certain 
evidence adduced by Guidotti were sufficient to demonstrate 
that there had been no meeting of the minds on an agreement 
to arbitrate and that Guidotti‟s claims against them were 
therefore not subject to arbitration. 
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Because we believe that the record before the District 
Court was insufficient to prove that there was no genuine 
dispute of material fact as to whether the Appellants and 
Guidotti agreed to arbitrate, we will vacate and remand the 
order denying arbitration.  In explaining our reasoning, we 
hope to clarify the standards to be applied to motions to 
compel arbitration, identifying the circumstances under which 
district courts should apply the standard for a motion to 
dismiss, as provided by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and those under which they should apply the 
summary judgment standard found in Rule 56. 
 
I. Background 
 
A. Facts 
 
Guidotti sued twenty-two defendants, alleging that 
they conspired to provide unlicensed debt adjustment services 
in violation of the New Jersey Debt Adjustment and Credit 
Counseling Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:16G-1, et seq., the New 
Jersey RICO statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-1, et seq., the 
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2, et 
seq., and various common law principles.  In short, she 
alleges that she was deceived into contracting with various 
defendants who led her to believe that they would convince 
her unsecured creditors to settle her consumer debts without 
her having to declare bankruptcy.  Instead, she says, the 
defendants participated in a conspiracy to fleece her of her 
remaining assets without negotiating with or protecting her 
from her creditors.  This appeal involves only two of the 
defendants, RMBT and Global.  Through them, Guidotti 
opened a special bank account into which she automatically 
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deposited a monthly amount.  Those funds were then 
supposedly to be used to pay the various defendants for their 
debt negotiation services, with the remaining funds to be used 
to pay a negotiated settlement.  RMBT was the financial 
institution at which she opened the account, and Global was 
the processing agent that operated the automatic transfers into 
and out of the account.   
 
To start at the beginning, however, Guidotti called 
defendant JG Debt Solutions in September 2009.  She had 
accumulated approximately $19,550 in unsecured consumer 
debt, including credit card debt, and she wanted help in 
reducing or negotiating a settlement of her debt, as she hoped 
to ward off bankruptcy.  She spoke with defendant Joel 
Gavalas, who described a “debt reduction program” through 
which her “credit card debt could be cut in half and paid off 
within three years.”  (App. at 96.)  Gavalas explained that 
defendant Eclipse Servicing, Inc. (“Eclipse”), a debt 
negotiation company, would evaluate her finances to 
determine whether she “qualified” for the program, and that, 
if she did, a payment program would be prepared for her.  
(Id.) 
 
After the initial call, Gavalas called Guidotti back and 
informed her that “she had been accepted in the program” and 
that Eclipse proposed two alternative plans for her.  (Id.)  He 
informed her that under either plan she would make monthly 
payments into a special bank account, and that the funds 
deposited into the account would pay for the debt settlement 
negotiation services and would also be used to settle her debts 
with her creditors.  Guidotti chose a three-year plan pursuant 
to which she would pay approximately $358 per month.  
Gavalas also informed her that she would be represented in 
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the debt negotiation process by attorneys from defendant 
Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC (“LHDR”), which calls 
itself a “national law firm” (id. at 333), and by Eclipse, the 
debt negotiation company with which LHDR works.   
 
Later that same month, on September 29, 2009, 
Guidotti received an email from accounts@plansvc.com, an 
email domain associated with LHDR and Eclipse.  The 
subject line of the email read “Debt Settlement Service 
Agreement,” and it contained a link that led to various online 
documents maintained by a company called “DocuSign.”  (Id. 
at 332.)  Included in the documents, Guidotti alleges, were 
two documents containing offers to form separate contracts: 
an attorney retainer agreement (the “ARA”) and an 
application to open a Special Purpose Account with RMBT.  
The application for the Special Purpose Account was called, 
not surprisingly, the Special Purpose Account Application 
(“SPAA”).   
 
The ARA laid out the respective roles of LHDR and 
Eclipse in the debt settlement negotiation plan, stated the fee 
arrangements with LHDR and Eclipse, and limited the scope 
of the representation to be provided by LHDR to only 
“negotiat[ing] and attempt[ing] to enter into settlements with 
creditors of [Guidotti] in an effort to modify and/or 
restructure [Guidotti‟s] current unsecured debt.”  (Id. at 98.)  
The ARA also included an arbitration clause that provided, 
inter alia, that “[i]n the event of any claim or dispute between 
[Guidotti] and LHDR related to the Agreement or related to 
any performance of any services related to this Agreement, 
such claim or dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration 
upon the request of either party upon the service of that 
request.”  (Id. at 193.)  Finally, the ARA contained a 
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provision specifying that Guidotti agreed to establish an 
“authorized bank account” from which service fees, including 
legal fees, would automatically be withdrawn on a monthly 
basis, with the first payment to start on September 30, 2009, 
and out of which she would eventually pay her creditors 
following a negotiated settlement.  (Id. at 191.) 
 
In furtherance of that last provision of the ARA, the 
collection of documents also included the SPAA, which 
characterized itself as an “application” for that authorized 
bank account.  (Id. at 195.)  Once signed, the SPAA purported 
to memorialize Guidotti‟s agreement to permit RMBT, 
“through its agent Global, to initiate debit entries” from her 
primary checking account at TD Bank to the RMBT Special 
Purpose Account in the amount of $348.68 per month, “for 
the purpose of accumulating funds to repay [her] debts in 
connection with a debt management program … sponsored by 
[LHDR].”  (Id.)  The application also stated that Guidotti 
agreed that Global was authorized to “periodically disburse[ ] 
funds from the Account pursuant to instructions that 
[Guidotti] may give from time to time.”  (Id.)  It also 
“authorize[d] payment from the Account of the fees and 
charges provided for in this Application and the Agreement.”  
(Id.) 
 
The SPAA included an acknowledgment and 
agreement that read: 
I understand that the Account‟s features, terms, 
conditions and rules are further described in an 
Account Agreement and Disclosure Statement 
[the “Account Agreement”] that accompanies 
this Application … .  I acknowledge that I have 
received a copy of the [Account Agreement]; 
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that I have read and understand it; that the 
[Account Agreement] is fully incorporated into 
this Application [the SPAA] by reference; and 
that I am bound by all of its terms and 
conditions. 
(Id. (emphasis in original).)  According to the amended 
complaint, Guidotti signed and submitted the ARA and the 
SPAA on September 29, 2009.
1
   
The SPAA referred to the Account Agreement nine 
times, but it gave no indication of what that agreement 
contained.  Most particularly, for present purposes, the SPAA 
                                              
1
 The documents contained in the record do not all 
corroborate Guidotti‟s assertion that she submitted the ARA 
and the SPAA on September 29, 2009.  It is true that the 
email that purportedly conveyed a link to those documents is 
dated September 29, 2009, as is her version of the 
electronically signed ARA.  But her version of the 
electronically signed SPAA is dated September 30, 2009.  
Those discrepancies are minor compared to the ones 
contained in the documents supplied by the Appellants.  Their 
version of the ARA is dated September 22, 2009, and their 
two versions of the SPAA are dated September 22, 2009, and 
September 30, 2009.  The Appellants did not provide any 
copy of the DocuSign email.  Because no party has 
endeavored to explain these discrepancies, and given our 
conclusion that, under the circumstances here, a summary 
judgment standard of review applies to the Appellants‟ 
motion to compel arbitration, see infra Part II.B.2, we treat 
the chronology represented in Guidotti‟s amended complaint 
as accurate. 
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did not indicate that the Account Agreement had the 
following arbitration clause: 
 
In the event of a dispute or claim relating in any 
way to this Agreement or our services, you 
agree that such dispute shall be resolved by 
binding arbitration in Tulsa Oklahoma utilizing 
a qualified independent arbitrator of Global‟s 
choosing.  The decision of an arbitrator will be 
final and subject to enforcement in a court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
(Id. at 185.)  The dispositive dispute before the District Court 
was whether the Account Agreement was included in the 
initial package of documents emailed to Guidotti in 
September 2009.  The Appellants say that it was, but Guidotti 
contends that it was not provided to her until later, when she 
received it in the mail along with a “welcome” letter on 
October 19, 2009 (App. at 342), three weeks after opening the 
special bank account and depositing her first monthly 
payment.  If the facts are as the Appellants claim, then 
presumably Guidotti had knowledge of and assented to the 
arbitration clause contained in the Account Agreement at the 
time she signed and submitted the SPAA.  If her version is 
true, then she can credibly argue that she did not assent to 
arbitration and is not bound by that provision. 
 
Guidotti‟s first payment to the Special Purpose 
Account was made on September 30, 2009.  Over the course 
of the following 15 months, she deposited into the account a 
total of $5,626.97.  After fees to LHDR and Eclipse were 
deducted, Guidotti was left with only $1,090.47 as of 
November 30, 2010.   
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During the fifteen months that Guidotti made the 
monthly payments, she did not pay anything on her credit 
cards or other debts, in accordance with what she says was 
her understanding of the debt settlement negotiation plan.
2
  
She received multiple calls and settlement offers from her 
creditors, all of which she forwarded to LHDR, expecting that 
they would address and negotiate a settlement of the 
accounts.  None of her debts were settled, however, and she 
observed no negotiation efforts undertaken by LHDR or 
Eclipse.   
 
Throughout 2010, Guidotti received increasingly dire 
communications from her creditors, eventually resulting in 
three of her four creditors suing to recover sums owed.  When 
she requested LHDR‟s assistance with a suit for recovery 
filed by Target National Bank, Eclipse responded by noting 
that the ARA was not intended to cover defending Guidotti 
from suits, “but rather to manage and settle debts.”  (Id. at 
101.)  Guidotti‟s final payment to the Special Purpose 
Account was made by cashier‟s check in December 2010 
because one of her creditors levied the remaining funds in her 
TD Bank checking account.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
                                              
2
 In her amended complaint, Guidotti claimed that “[i]f 
the customer asked [defendant JG Debt Solutions] if they 
[sic] should make their minimum payments, they were told 
that if they did, it would interfere with the negotiation process 
and make it harder to negotiate.”  (App. at 110.) 
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Guidotti filed a putative class action in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, Burlington County, on January 28, 
2011.  Defendant LHDR removed the action to the District 
Court on March 4, 2011, and Guidotti then filed the now 
operative pleading, her amended complaint, on March 17, 
2011.  Shortly thereafter, on March 23, 2011, thirteen of the 
twenty-two defendants, including the Appellants, filed two 
separate motions to compel arbitration, and the remaining 
defendants either filed motions to stay the action pending 
arbitration or later sought to join the motions to stay.  On 
December 20, 2011, the District Court ordered the matter to 
be sent to arbitration, based on the motion filed by LHDR, 
Eclipse, and others, holding that the ARA‟s arbitration clause 
is “valid and enforceable.”  Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt 
Resolution, L.L.C., 866 F. Supp. 2d 315, 329 (D.N.J. 2011). 
 
The District Court did not, however, grant the motion 
to compel arbitration filed by RMBT and Global.  In her 
response to that motion, Guidotti had attached copies of the 
SPAA, the ARA, and the Account Agreement.  She noted that 
the SPAA and the ARA each contained headers bearing the 
name “DocuSign,” indicating that they came from the 
DocuSign website linked to the email she had received.  Id. at 
333.  In contrast, the Account Agreement did not bear a 
similar header, so Guidotti argued that it had not been 
provided to her in that September 29, 2009 email.  Id. 
 
Based on that evidence and also on the belief that the 
Appellants had, in four earlier cases from other jurisdictions, 
provided the Account Agreement to similarly situated 
plaintiffs only after those other plaintiffs had signed and 
submitted the SPAA, the District Court concluded that “the 
record is sufficient to establish that [Guidotti] did not receive 
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the [Account Agreement] in her initial collection of 
documents sent via e-mail … .”  Id.  Without requiring or 
permitting discovery on the matter, the Court held that 
Guidotti “d[id] not appear to have had knowledge of and 
assented to the incorporated terms.”  Id. 336 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
The Appellants then sought our review of the denial of 
their motion to compel arbitration.   
 
II. Discussion
3
 
                                              
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction under the Class 
Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).  Although, as 
the District Court acknowledged, complete diversity does not 
exist, Guidotti, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 321 n.1, complete diversity 
is not required under § 1332(d)(2) as long as, pertinent to this 
case, “the matter in controversy” is “a class action,” the 
aggregate amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value 
of $5,000,000,” and “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a 
citizen of a State different from any defendant.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(2)(A).  Each of those requirements is met in this 
case.   
The District Court also had jurisdiction to decide the 
motion to compel arbitration under the FAA, which provides: 
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, 
neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a 
written agreement for arbitration may petition 
any United States district court which, save for 
such agreement, would have jurisdiction under 
title 28, in a civil matter … of the subject matter 
of a suit arising out of the controversy between 
13 
 
A. Standard for Evaluating Motions to Compel  
  Arbitration 
 
Because “[a]rbitration is a matter of contract between 
the parties,” a judicial mandate to arbitrate must be predicated 
upon the parties‟ consent.  Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge 
Fabrics Co., Ltd., 636 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir. 1980).  The 
Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., 
enables the enforcement of a contract to arbitrate, but requires 
that a court shall be “satisfied that the making of the 
agreement for arbitration … is not in issue” before it orders 
arbitration.  Id. § 4.  “In the event that the making of the 
arbitration agreement is in issue, then „the court shall proceed 
summarily to the trial‟ of that issue.”  Par-Knit Mills, 636 
F.2d at 54 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).  “[T]he party who is 
contesting the making of the agreement has the right to have 
the issue presented to a jury.”  Id. 
 
Our precedents are not entirely clear on the standard 
for district courts to apply when determining whether, in a 
                                                                                                     
the parties, for an order directing that such 
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for 
in such agreement. 
9 U.S.C. § 4. 
We have jurisdiction to review a district court‟s denial 
of a motion to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(1)(1)(B).  See also Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem 
Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 227-28 (3d Cir. 2012) (court of 
appeals has jurisdiction to review a district court order 
denying motion to compel arbitration even if the motion was 
denied without prejudice). 
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specific case, an agreement to arbitrate was actually reached.  
The issue typically arises when one of the parties files a 
motion to compel arbitration.  Some of our cases “support the 
traditional practice of treating a motion to compel arbitration 
as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted,” under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 
372 F.3d 588, 597 (3d Cir. 2004).  We have also said, 
however, that “when considering a motion to compel 
arbitration … [a district court] should” employ “the standard 
used … in resolving summary judgment motions pursuant to 
[Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].”  Par-Knit 
Mills, 636 F.2d at 54 & n.9; see also Kaneff v. Del. Title 
Loans, Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2009) (“A district 
court decides a motion to compel arbitration under the same 
standard it applies to a motion for summary judgment.”).  In 
this case, the District Court did not identify the standard it 
employed to analyze the Appellants‟ motion to compel 
arbitration.  It simply said that, although there had been no 
discovery, the record was “sufficient to establish that 
[Guidotti] did not receive the [Account Agreement] in her 
initial collection of documents sent via e-mail,” and that 
therefore there had been no agreement to arbitrate.  Guidotti, 
866 F. Supp. 2d at 333. 
 
“We exercise plenary review over questions regarding 
the validity and enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate,” 
Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 
2010), and we are first obliged to determine which standard 
should have been applied, cf. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon 
Seamen’s Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[W]e 
apply the same standard the district court should have applied 
in reviewing the arbitration award.” (citation omitted)).  
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Answering that question is of utmost importance because the 
two standards differ in significant ways.  The test in 
reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether, under any “plausible” reading 
of the pleadings, the plaintiff would be entitled to relief.  Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  We 
will affirm a district court‟s dismissal for failure to state a 
claim “only if, accepting all factual allegations as true and 
construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, we determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief 
under any reasonable reading of the complaint.”  McGovern 
v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  We 
“consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the 
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly 
authentic documents if the complainant‟s claims are based 
upon these documents,” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 
230 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
Under Rule 56, by contrast, a “court shall grant 
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  The party asserting that there is a genuine dispute of 
material fact must support that assertion by “citing to 
particular parts of … the record, including depositions, 
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 
declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory 
answers, or other materials.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).  In 
evaluating the motion, “the court must draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not 
make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”  
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 
150 (2000).  Because summary judgment can be supported or 
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defeated by citing a developed record, courts must give the 
parties “adequate time for discovery.”  Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
 
In short, “[b]oth the burden on the non-moving party 
and the documents available to that party … differ 
significantly under the motion to dismiss and summary 
judgment standards.”  Somerset Consulting, LLC v. United 
Capital Lenders, LLC, 832 F. Supp. 2d 474, 479 (E.D. Pa. 
2011).
4
  Under the standard applied to a motion to dismiss, a 
“defendant need only shoulder a single burden – to show that 
the complaint fails to state a claim.”  Id.  To combat the 
motion, the plaintiff typically “can rely only on the complaint 
and selected other documents.”  Id.  Under a summary 
judgment standard, however, “a burden-shifting framework 
applies,” id., pursuant to which the moving party bears the 
initial burden of showing that the non-movant has failed to 
establish one or more essential elements of its case, and, once 
that initial burden is met, the non-moving party must “go 
beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 
„depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file,‟ designate „specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.‟”  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(e)).  A party opposing a motion for summary 
judgment has significantly more material at his disposal than 
when opposing a motion to dismiss, given that he may cite 
evidence gained during discovery. 
 
                                              
4
 Much of our analysis here is drawn from the 
insightful opinion in Somerset Consulting written by the 
Honorable Stewart R. Dalzell of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
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Our inconsistent pronouncements on the applicable 
standard for evaluating motions to compel arbitration are 
perhaps explained by the competing purposes of the FAA, 
and by the values underlying contract interpretation.  On one 
hand, the FAA places considerable emphasis on “efficient and 
speedy dispute resolution.”  Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. 
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); see also Prima Paint Corp. 
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) 
(remarking on “the unmistakably clear congressional purpose 
that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to 
a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction 
in the courts”).  The Supreme Court has explained that, in 
pursuit of that goal, the FAA “calls for a summary and speedy 
disposition of motions or petitions to enforce arbitration 
clauses.”  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 29 (1983).  On the other hand, speed is not 
the sole or even the dominant goal of the FAA.  The Supreme 
Court has identified the “enforcement of private agreements,” 
as another important aim, Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 221, and it 
has “reject[ed] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the 
Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of 
claims,” id. at 219. 
 
The significant role courts play in interpreting the 
validity and scope of contract provisions applies an additional 
brake on the FAA‟s speed impulse.  Although the FAA 
manifests “a congressional declaration of a liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements,” Moses H. Cone, 460 
U.S. at 24, “questions of arbitrability, including challenges to 
an arbitration agreement‟s validity, are presumed to be 
questions for judicial determination,” Quilloin v. Tenet 
HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012); 
see also First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 
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944 (1995) (“Courts should not assume that the parties agreed 
to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is „clea[r] and 
unmistakabl[e]‟ evidence that they did so.” (alterations in 
original) (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of 
Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986))).  Accordingly, “[b]efore a 
party to a lawsuit can be ordered to arbitrate and thus be 
deprived of a day in court, there should be an express, 
unequivocal agreement to that effect.”  Par-Knit Mills, 636 
F.2d at 54. 
 
Viewed in light of those competing goals, our split 
pronouncements on the standard for deciding a motion to 
compel arbitration are reconcilable.  “[W]here the affirmative 
defense of arbitrability of claims is apparent on the face of a 
complaint (or … documents relied upon in the complaint),” 
Somerset, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 481, “the FAA would favor 
resolving a motion to compel arbitration under a motion to 
dismiss standard without the inherent delay of discovery,” id. 
at 482.  That approach appropriately fosters the FAA‟s 
interest in speedy dispute resolution.  In those circumstances, 
“[t]he question to be answered … becomes whether the 
assertions of the complaint, given the required broad sweep, 
would permit adduction of proofs that would provide a 
recognized legal basis” for rejecting the affirmative defense.  
Leone v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 599 F.2d 566, 567 (3d Cir. 
1979). 
 
In many cases, however, a more deliberate pace is 
required, in light of both the FAA‟s insistence that private 
agreements be honored and the judicial responsibility to 
interpret the parties‟ agreement, if any, to arbitrate.  Thus, a 
Rule 12(b)(6) standard is inappropriate when either “the 
motion to compel arbitration does not have as its predicate a 
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complaint with the requisite clarity” to establish on its face 
that the parties agreed to arbitrate, Somerset, 832 F. Supp. 2d 
at 482, or the opposing party has come forth with reliable 
evidence that is more than a “naked assertion … that it did 
not intend to be bound” by the arbitration agreement, even 
though on the face of the pleadings it appears that it did.  Par-
Knit Mills, 636 F.2d at 55.  Under the first scenario, 
arbitrability not being apparent on the face of the complaint, 
the motion to compel arbitration must be denied pending 
further development of the factual record.  The second 
scenario will come into play when the complaint and 
incorporated documents facially establish arbitrability but the 
non-movant has come forward with enough evidence in 
response to the motion to compel arbitration to place the 
question in issue.  At that point, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard is 
no longer appropriate, and the issue should be judged under 
the Rule 56 standard.  See id. (judging motion to compel 
arbitration under summary judgment standard where plaintiff 
presented “[a]n unequivocal denial that the agreement had 
been made, accompanied by supporting affidavits”). 
 
Under either of those scenarios, a “restricted inquiry 
into factual issues” will be necessary to properly evaluate 
whether there was a meeting of the minds on the agreement to 
arbitrate, Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 22, and the non-movant 
“must be given the opportunity to conduct limited discovery 
on the narrow issue concerning the validity” of the arbitration 
agreement, Deputy v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 345 F.3d 494, 511 
(7th Cir. 2003).
5
  In such circumstances, Rule 56 furnishes the 
                                              
5
 Pre-arbitration discovery has been held necessary in 
other contexts.  In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), the Supreme Court 
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“established the right of a claimant to invoke discovery 
procedures in the pre-arbitration proceeding in order to assist 
the claimant in meeting her burden of showing the likelihood 
[that arbitration will] bear[] prohibitive costs.”  Blair v. Scott 
Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608-09 (3d Cir. 2002).  
“Arbitration costs are directly related to a litigant‟s ability to 
pursue [a] claim,” id. at 605, because “„the existence of large 
arbitration costs could preclude a litigant … from effectively 
vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum,‟” 
id. (alteration in original) (quoting Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 
90).  The plaintiff in Green Tree had argued that she would be 
unable to vindicate her statutory rights in arbitration because 
“the arbitration agreement‟s silence with respect to costs and 
fees create[d] a „risk‟ that she [would] be required to bear 
prohibitive arbitration costs if she pursue[d] her claims in an 
arbitral forum.”  Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90.  Discussing 
Green Tree in Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, we stated that, 
“[a]lthough discovery is ordinarily not undertaken at such an 
early stage of a proceeding that is governed by an arbitration 
agreement, there is language in the Supreme Court‟s opinion 
faulting the claimant for not presenting evidence „during 
discovery,‟” Blair, 283 F.3d at 609 (quoting Green Tree, 531 
U.S. at 92), and we noted that, during oral argument before it, 
“the Supreme Court assumed that discovery was available,” 
Id.  In Blair, the plaintiff argued that a fee-splitting provision 
in the arbitration agreement would similarly prevent her from 
vindicating her statutory rights.  Id. at 605.  The need for 
discovery in that context is apparent, we said, because, 
“[w]ithout some discovery, albeit limited to the narrow issue 
of the estimated costs of arbitration and the claimant‟s ability 
to pay, it is not clear how a claimant could present 
information on the costs of arbitration,” or “how the 
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defendant could meet its burden to rebut the claimant‟s 
allegation that she cannot afford to share the cost.”  Id. 
Pre-arbitration discovery has also been allowed to 
determine whether an arbitration clause is unconscionable.  
See, e.g., Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., V.I., Inc., 368 F.3d 
269, 284 (3d Cir. 2004) (remanding for “the development of a 
record” on whether the reasonably anticipated costs of 
arbitration and the plaintiff‟s financial situation would make 
arbitration prohibitively expensive, because “an arbitration 
provision that makes the arbitral forum prohibitively 
expensive for a weaker party is unconscionable”).  In 
addition, it has commonly been allowed to determine whether 
an agreement to arbitrate has been formed.  See, e.g., 
SBRMCOA, LLC v. Bayside Resort, Inc., 707 F.3d 267, 272-
73 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that “additional discovery [was] 
warranted” on the issue of whether the plaintiff‟s board acted 
ultra vires when it signed an agreement containing an 
arbitration clause); Deputy v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 345 F.3d 
494, 511 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the defendant “must be 
given the opportunity to conduct limited discovery on the 
narrow issue concerning the validity of [the plaintiff‟s] 
signature” in arbitration agreement); Application of 
Deiulemar Compagnia Di Navigazione S.p.A. v. M/V Allegra, 
198 F.3d 473, 482 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Rule 81 [of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure] … would authorize a district court, 
in enforcing an arbitration agreement, to „order discovery 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 on matters relevant to the 
existence of an arbitration agreement.‟” (quoting Champ v. 
Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 276 (7th Cir. 1995))); 
Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 726 (9th Cir. 
1999) (“The FAA provides for discovery and a full trial in 
connection with a motion to compel arbitration only if „the 
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correct standard for ensuring that arbitration is awarded only 
if there is “an express, unequivocal agreement to that effect.”  
Par-Knit Mills, 636 F.2d at 54.
6
 
                                                                                                     
making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or 
refusal to perform the same be in issue.‟” (quoting 9 U.S.C. 
§ 4)).  Given that “[t]he burden of proving a generally 
applicable contract defense lies with the party challenging the 
contract provision,” Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC., 369 F.3d 263, 
274 (3d Cir. 2004), the need for discovery in these types of 
situations is evident.  Indeed, any time the court must make a 
finding to determine arbitrability, pre-arbitration discovery 
may be warranted.  See, e.g., Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l 
Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 112 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that “when 
the very existence of … an [arbitration] agreement is 
disputed, a district court is correct to refuse to compel 
arbitration until it resolves the threshold question of whether 
the arbitration agreement exists”). 
6
 The conversion of the standard for reviewing a 
motion to compel arbitration mirrors the process provided by 
Rule 12(d) for converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for 
summary judgment.  That rule provides that “[i]f, on a motion 
under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings 
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” 
and “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to 
present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(d).  Once the motion is converted to a motion 
for summary judgment, reasonable allowance must be made 
for the parties to obtain discovery.  See E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (“Such conversion is not appropriate where the 
parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable 
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To summarize, when it is apparent, based on “the face 
of a complaint, and documents relied upon in the complaint,” 
that certain of a party‟s claims “are subject to an enforceable 
arbitration clause, a motion to compel arbitration should be 
considered under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard without 
discovery‟s delay.”  Somerset, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 482.  But if 
the complaint and its supporting documents are unclear 
regarding the agreement to arbitrate, or if the plaintiff has 
responded to a motion to compel arbitration with additional 
facts sufficient to place the agreement to arbitrate in issue, 
then “the parties should be entitled to discovery on the 
question of arbitrability before a court entertains further 
briefing on [the] question.”  Id.  After limited discovery, the 
court may entertain a renewed motion to compel arbitration, 
this time judging the motion under a summary judgment 
standard.  In the event that summary judgment is not 
warranted because “the party opposing arbitration can 
demonstrate, by means of citations to the record,” that there is 
“a genuine dispute as to the enforceability of the arbitration 
clause,” the “court may then proceed summarily to a trial 
regarding „the making of the arbitration agreement or the 
failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same,‟ as Section 4 
of the FAA envisions.”  Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4). 
 
B. Application to This Case 
 
 1. Clarity of the Pleadings 
                                                                                                     
discovery.”).  Otherwise, weighing the new factual assertions 
against the facts pleaded in the complaint would “invite[] 
courts to consider facts and evidence that have not been tested 
in formal discovery.”  Pfeil v. State St. Bank and Trust Co., 
671 F.3d 585, 594 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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The Appellants contend that Guidotti‟s complaint was 
sufficiently clear to establish that she received, and agreed to 
the terms of, the Account Agreement when she signed the 
SPAA.  They base that contention on language from the 
complaint itself and on the SPAA, which is a document cited 
extensively in the complaint.  First, they argue that, by stating 
in her complaint that she received by email “a Special 
Purpose Account application [the SPAA], and account 
agreement establishing a Special Purpose Account” (App. at 
97), Guidotti “affirmatively alleged,” “[b]y the use of the 
comma, and the conjunction „and‟ between the designation of 
the „Special Purpose Account application‟ and the „account 
agreement,‟” that she received both the SPAA and the 
Account Agreement in the same email.  (Appellants‟ Opening 
Br. at 15-16.)  Second, they note that the SPAA, which 
Guidotti signed and submitted on September 29, 2009, states 
that the Special Purpose Account‟s “features, terms, 
conditions and rules are further described in an Account 
Agreement and Disclosure Statement that accompanies this 
Application.”  (App. at 183.)  The next sentence provides (in 
italics and bold), “I acknowledge that I have received a copy 
of the [Account] Agreement; that I have read and understood 
it; that the [Account] Agreement is fully incorporated into this 
Application by reference; and that I am bound by all of its 
terms and conditions.”  (Id.)  According to the Appellants, the 
SPAA is “a signed, contemporaneous document” that 
establishes that Guidotti received the Account Agreement at 
the same time as the SPAA, and that she therefore was 
cognizant of, and assented to, binding arbitration.  
(Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 14.)  Thus, our first task is to 
determine whether the complaint and the SPAA, which is 
relied upon in the complaint, establish on their face that 
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Guidotti agreed to be bound by the terms of the Account 
Agreement, including its provision for arbitration, thereby 
triggering a Rule 12(b)(6) standard. 
 
In that regard, the Appellants make a compelling case.  
It is true, as the District Court concluded, that Guidotti‟s 
“vague reference to „agreement‟ in the Amended Complaint 
… does not clearly contradict” a finding that she was not 
emailed the Account Agreement, because “the sentence could 
be interpreted to mean that [Guidotti] was characterizing the 
„Special Purpose Account‟ document as both an application 
and an agreement, which she signed and returned.”  Guidotti, 
866 F. Supp. 2d at 333.  But her signed acknowledgment of 
receipt of the Account Agreement and her acceptance of its 
terms is unequivocal.  The signed SPAA states on its face that 
Guidotti “received a copy” of the Account Agreement, that 
she “read and understood it,” and that she knew she was 
“bound by all of its terms and conditions.”  (App. at 183 
(emphasis omitted).)  Under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, there 
would be no reading of the complaint, no matter how friendly 
to Guidotti, that could rightly relieve her of the arbitration 
provision in the Account Agreement, if the complaint were 
the only document in play.  But it is not the only relevant 
document, and Guidotti‟s evidence cannot be ignored. 
 
2. Guidotti’s Assertion That She Did Not 
Intend to Be Bound by the Terms of the 
Account Agreement 
Despite her signed acknowledgment, Guidotti asserts 
that in reality the Account Agreement was not supplied to her 
and she accordingly was unaware of its arbitration provision, 
until she received it in the mail on October 19, 2009, three 
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weeks after she had submitted the SPAA.  She thus argues 
that she did not agree to, and cannot be bound by, the 
provisions of the Account Agreement, because she did not see 
them at the time she agreed to the contract and there was no 
meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate. 
 
The Appellants repeatedly insist that, in the words of 
Par-Knit Mills, Guidotti‟s denial in the face of the SPAA‟s 
acknowledgment of receipt of the Account Agreement is a 
mere “naked assertion” that she “did not intend to be bound 
by the terms” of the Account Agreement.  Par-Knit Mills, 636 
F.2d at 55.  As such, they argue, it is “insufficient to place in 
issue the „making of the arbitration agreement‟” under the 
FAA, id., and the District Court should have granted without 
further delay the motion to compel arbitration. 
 
But contrary to the Appellants‟ emphatic position, 
Guidotti‟s denial is not entirely unsupported.  Rather, she 
pointed out to the District Court, and has noted again on 
appeal, that the one-page SPAA and every page of the ARA, 
each supplied separately by her and the Appellants, have an 
encoded “DocuSign” header line, but that the Account 
Agreement, which was also provided by both sides, does not 
have it.  From that evidence, she argues that the documents 
that contain the header – the ARA and the SPAA – were sent 
to her by email on September 29, 2009, with the intent that 
she would sign and return them, while the document that does 
not contain the header – the Account Agreement – was only 
later mailed to her on October 19, 2009.  The question, then, 
is whether that evidence is sufficient to move the case beyond 
the pleadings and warrant the application of the summary 
judgment standard, with its accompanying call for discovery 
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and perhaps a limited trial if a genuine issue of material fact 
emerges. 
 
To answer that, we look to Par-Knit Mills.  The 
contract at issue in that case had “a space designated for 
signature entitled „Buyer‟s Acceptance.‟”  Par-Knit Mills, 
636 F.2d at 52.  The documents also contained a paragraph 
“entitled „Arbitration‟ [that] clearly stated, albeit in small 
print, that any claim arising out of the contract or the 
merchandise covered thereby shall be submitted to and 
determined by arbitration.”  Id. at 53.  The parties “agree[d] 
that there had been no prior oral discussions or agreements 
regarding arbitration.”  Id.  In addition, the plaintiff, Par-Knit 
Mills, admitted that one of its plant production managers 
signed the Buyer‟s Acceptance.  Id.  It asserted, however, that 
the production manager “signed the documents as 
confirmation only of the delivery dates contained therein, and 
that Par-Knit Mills never intended to bind itself to the clauses 
contained in the confirmations.”  Id.  In other words, Par-Knit 
Mills “claim[ed] that there was never a „meeting of the 
minds‟ on the terms and conditions contained in the 
confirmations and that absent such agreement, there can be no 
duty to arbitrate,” notwithstanding the production manager‟s 
signature.  Id. 
 
As support, Par-Knit Mills argued that the production 
manager lacked the authority to execute contracts on behalf of 
the corporation and that the corporation therefore could not be 
bound by his signature, “no matter how clearly the document 
was labeled.”  Id. at 55.  It also presented a sworn affidavit of 
the production manager asserting that it was not his intention 
to confirm all provisions of the contract, but merely to affirm 
the dates of delivery.  Id. at 54.  Under those circumstances, 
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we held, “it is for a jury and not the court” to determine 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate.  Id. at 55. 
 
In so holding, we recognized that our ruling “may run 
contrary to the general policy of encouraging the arbitration 
of disputes,” id., and we contemplated the possibility of 
parties trying to dodge their obligations.  For example, “[a] 
party may, in an effort to avoid arbitration, contend that it did 
not intend to enter into the agreement which contained an 
arbitration clause.”  Id.  Such “[a] naked assertion … by a 
party to a contract that it did not intend to be bound by the 
terms [of an arbitration clause],” we reasoned, would be 
“insufficient to place in issue the „making of the arbitration 
agreement‟” for purposes of the FAA.  Id.  But we did not 
want to cut off legitimate disputes over an alleged agreement 
to arbitrate when there has been “[a]n unequivocal denial that 
the agreement had been made, accompanied by supporting 
affidavits … [;] in most cases [that] should be sufficient to 
require a jury determination on whether there had in fact been 
a „meeting of the minds.‟”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 
We find further support for that conclusion in Kirleis 
v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 
2009), a case in which we examined whether a lawyer had 
agreed to an arbitration provision contained in her firm‟s 
bylaws.  She alleged in a sworn affidavit that she “was never 
provided with a copy of the By-Laws of defendant Firm,” had 
“never signed any agreement or document which refers to or 
incorporates the arbitration provision in the By-Laws,” and 
had “never agreed to arbitrate … claims against Firm.”  Id. at 
159-60.  Although the law firm did not “submit[] 
contradictory evidence showing that Kirleis had received the 
bylaws or had signed them,” we noted that, even if it had, 
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“the task of weighing the evidence and choosing which side 
to believe would have been for a jury.”  Id. at 161-62 (citing 
Par-Knit Mills, 636 F.2d at 54).  “Accordingly,” we held, 
“Kirleis‟s allegations create a genuine issue of fact as to the 
existence of an agreement to arbitrate.”  Id. at 162. 
 
It is true that, unlike the plaintiffs in Par-Knit Mills 
and Kirleis, Guidotti has not produced any affidavits to 
support her claim that she did not receive the Account 
Agreement until October 2009.  Had she done so – had she 
sworn in an affidavit that she did not receive that agreement 
until three weeks after signing and returning the SPAA, for 
example – the facts of this case would be very similar to Par-
Knit Mills and Kirleis, and we could more easily find that she 
had come forward with enough evidence to move beyond the 
pleadings and trigger the application of the summary 
judgment standard to determine whether there was a meeting 
of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate.  But, even without 
an affidavit, the evidence concerning the DocuSign headers is 
not insubstantial.  If Guidotti is correct that any document 
linked in the email that also linked to the SPAA would, like 
the SPAA, have a DocuSign header, then the fact that neither 
party has furnished a version of the Account Agreement 
bearing a DocuSign header is significant.  We accordingly 
hold that Guidotti came forth with enough evidence in 
response to the Appellants‟ arbitration motion to trigger, 
pursuant to Par-Knit Mills and Kirleis, the summary 
judgment standard found in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
 
3. Genuine Issue of Material Fact 
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Although Guidotti‟s proffer of evidence placed in issue 
the parties‟ agreement to arbitrate, the District Court did not 
order discovery on the question, but instead “conclude[d],” on 
the very limited evidence before it, “that the record is 
sufficient to establish that [Guidotti] did not receive the 
[Account Agreement] in her initial collection of documents 
sent via e-mail.”  Guidotti, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 333.  Stated 
differently, the Court held that, despite Guidotti‟s own 
signature on a document acknowledging receipt of the 
Account Agreement, the Appellants had not put forth enough 
evidence to establish even a genuine dispute of material fact 
on whether she had received that agreement and hence had 
notice of the arbitration clause.  Instead, the Court summarily 
found that Guidotti had not received it until weeks after she 
had signed and returned the SPAA and thereby formed the 
contract. 
 
The Court arrived at its conclusion for two reasons, it 
seems.  First, it apparently accepted Guidotti‟s argument that 
the emailed documents contained a DocuSign header, but the 
Account Agreement did not, and that the implication of that 
difference was highly significant.  Second, and perhaps most 
convincing to the Court, it found support for Guidotti‟s 
assertion in four cases from other jurisdictions in which the 
same parties who appear before us now as the Appellants 
purportedly provided customers with the same form of 
Account Agreement only after those customers had already 
signed the SPAA.  Specifically, the Court cited Carlsen v. 
Global Client Solutions, LLC, 423 F. App‟x 697 (9th Cir. 
2011) (nonprecedential), Davis v. Global Client Solutions, 
LLC, 2011 WL 4738547, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 7, 2011) 
(unreported), Webster v. Freedom Debt Relief, LLC, No. 
1:10CV1587, 2011 WL 3422872 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 2011) 
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(unreported), and Festa v. Capital One Bank, ATL-L-4851-10 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 21, 2011) (unreported).  
Believing the factual circumstances of those cases to match 
Guidotti‟s assertion that she did not receive the Account 
Agreement until after she had already signed and submitted 
the SPAA, the District Court noted that “Defendants Global 
and RMBT seem to be accustomed to making this argument 
that the late-arriving conditions in the [Account Agreement] 
should bind the consumer, perhaps because they so frequently 
fail to send a copy of the [Account Agreement] until after the 
consumer/debtor has already committed to its terms via the 
incorporation clause in the SPAA.”  Guidotti, 866 F. Supp. 2d 
at 335 n.7.  The Court even indicated that it could find that 
business practice “unconscionable” because, “based only on 
the cases cited by the Parties in this dispute, Plaintiff Guidotti 
appears to be the fifth customer so treated by these 
Defendants.”  Id. at 336 n.8. 
 
Unlike the District Court, we are persuaded that a 
genuine issue of material fact remains regarding the 
agreement to arbitrate.  We do not agree, in other words, that, 
based on her unsworn claim that the Account Agreement did 
not accompany the package of documents originally emailed 
to her in September 2009, and based further on the cases 
relied on by the District Court, Guidotti was entitled to 
summary judgment on the question of whether the parties had 
agreed to arbitrate. 
 
Although it is true that neither side has come forth 
with a version of the Account Agreement that contains the 
DocuSign header, there has been no showing that all 
documents provided in the link included in the September 
2009 email must necessarily contain the header.  Said 
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differently, we have no way of knowing whether some of the 
documents provided in the email link could have borne the 
DocuSign header (the ARA and the SPAA, for example) 
while others did not (perhaps the Account Agreement).  The 
headers certainly cast doubt on the proposition that the 
Account Agreement was included in the original email, but 
they do not establish that fact outright.  Presumably, limited 
discovery regarding the email would have cleared up the issue 
– either the emailed link contained the Account Agreement or 
it did not – but given that no discovery has taken place, any 
summary conclusion is unwarranted. 
 
In addition, the cases from other jurisdictions that 
involved the Appellants are less compelling in our view than 
they were to the District Court.  Indeed, in two of those cases, 
the courts found that the customer had timely received the 
Account Agreement and granted the respective motions to 
compel arbitration.  See Davis, 2011 WL 4738547, at *1 
(holding that plaintiff had agreed to be bound by the terms of 
the Account Agreement by signing a second SPAA after 
receiving the Account Agreement); Webster, 2011 WL 
3422872, at *2 (granting motion to compel arbitration and 
adopting the reports and recommendations of the magistrate 
judge, including a finding that the plaintiff received a copy of 
the Account Agreement with the SPAA).
7
   
                                              
7
 In the other two cases, the courts did find that the 
Account Agreement was provided only after the contractual 
agreement had commenced with the signing of the SPAA.  
See Carlsen v. Global Client Solutions, LLC, 423 F. App‟x 
697, 698-99 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2011) (holding that plaintiffs 
had not agreed to arbitrate because the SPAA did not contain 
an arbitration clause and because the Account Agreement was 
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Thus, the District Court should not have denied the 
Appellants‟ motion to compel arbitration without first 
allowing limited discovery and then entertaining their motion 
under a summary judgment standard.  If, after presentation of 
the evidence uncovered during discovery, a genuine dispute 
of material fact remained, the Court then should have 
submitted to a jury (if either party demanded one) the factual 
question of whether Guidotti was aware of the arbitration 
clause in the Account Agreement at the time she signed and 
submitted the SPAA.
8
 
III. Conclusion 
                                                                                                     
not available to the plaintiffs when they signed the SPAA); 
Capital One Bank v. Festa, C.A. No. ATL-L-4851-10 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 21, 2011) (finding that customer did 
not receive the Account Agreement until two weeks after 
signing the SPAA). 
8
 In their briefing, the Appellants asserted in the 
alternative that “[e]ven if the [Account Agreement] was 
omitted from the package that was e-mailed to Guidotti” on 
September 29, 2009, the arbitration clause is still enforceable.  
(Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 16.)  At oral argument, however, 
counsel for the Appellants stated that, if this Court were to 
vacate the District Court‟s order and remand for additional 
evidentiary development on the validity of the agreement to 
arbitrate, our review of those arguments would be 
“unnecessary.”  See Oral Argument at 30:30-31:00, available 
at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/12-
1170Guidotti%20v%20Legal%20 
Helpers%20Debt%20Resolution%20LLC%20et%20al.wma.  
We accordingly do not address those arguments here. 
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For the foregoing reasons we will vacate the District 
Court‟s order denying the Appellants‟ motion to compel 
arbitration and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
